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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff (Dunagan) and Defendant (Kircher) married on May 27, 2000. At the 
time Dunagan and Kircher entered into the marriage, they orally agreed they would keep 
their finances separate. During their marriage, Dunagan and Kircher kept their finances 
separate. Kircher paid all insurance and payments on the home she owned prior to their 
marriage and her business. Dunagan gave Kircher $500 on two occasions. 
(Memorandum Opinion & Decision, pg.3). Shortly after the marriage, Kircher attempted 
to refinance the home. As a condition of the loan, the lending instibtion prepared a 
quitclaim deed from Kircher to Dunagan and Kircher, which quitclaim deed was 
executed by Kircher and recorded in July 2001 as Instrument Number 187321, records of 
Clearwater County, Idaho. 
The parties subsequently purchased the Krystal Cafb building in Orofino, Idaho. 
A portion of the purchased premises was sold. The parties extensively remodeled the 
remainder of the real property in order to house the "Krystal Caf6" business, a business 
owned and operated by Kircher prior to the marriage and her separate property. 
The parties separated in 2005 and an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce was entered 
on March 21, 2006. The Interlocutory Decree of Divorce resolved all the parties' issues 
except the distributioil of property and debt. At trial Kircher attempted to testify as to the 
oral prenuptial agreement of the parties - the context of her reasoning for executing the 
quitclaim to her husband so shortly after their marriage. Her testimony was excluded 
under the Parole Evidence Rule, but the Court did accept an offer of proof by Kircher. 
This offer of proof included that Kircher made all the payments on the home, all 
tax payments, all insurance payments and all utility payments from her earnings. (Tr. pg. 
171). Having rejected Kircher's testimony, the Court treated the entire value of the home 
as an asset of the community. 
In dividing the property, the Court found tbat Dunagan was entitled to an 
equalization payment of $108,500. (Memorandum Opinion & Decision, pg. 8). The 
Court granted Kircher sixty (60) days in which to make the payment and ordered that if 
Kircher timely made such payment tbat Dunagan would sign over and release to Kircher 
all his interest in the Krystal Caf6 building. At trial, Kircher had testified she could raise 
$30,000 as an equalization payment. (Tr. pg. 166, 1. 13-18). The Court further ordered 
that if Kircher did not make the payment on the building, the property would put up for 
sale in a reasonably commercial manner because there were no other properties available 
to Dunagan to make the equalization payment. 
Kircher moved to modify the magistrate's order. Among other things, Kircher 
asked the Court to: 1) require Dunagan to pay one-half of the costs of sale should the 
building be sold; and 2) adjust the amount of the equalization payment to reflect the 
actual sale price, should the building be sold. 
The magistrate agreed that if the building is sold, Dunagan must pay one-half the 
sale costs, which will be paid by reducing his $108,500 equalization payment by the 
amount of such costs. However, the magistrate declined to adjust the equalization 
payment based on the actual sale price: 
The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the 
Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. 
Despite such appeal, I deny Defendant's request. 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at 
the time of the Decree based upon the fair market value of 
the property at the time of the divorce. Brinkmeyer v. 
Brinkinever, 135 Idaho 596, 600, 21 P.3d 918 (2001). As 
noted by the Supreme Court, "Any community asset may 
change in value after the division of the community. This 
is not a reason to modify the division. Ross v. Ross, 117 
Idaho 548, 789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not 
be penalized by the Defendant's actions while controlling 
use of the building or by the vagaries of the market. By 
fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed 
from becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiffs 
actioils or inactions in controlling the building since the 
date the value was established. Also, the Defendant has 
alternatives to selling the Caf6 such as by selling her own 
home andlor loans. 
Order to Amend Decree of Divorce, pgs. 2-3. 
Kircher appealed the Magistrate's decision to the District Court. The District 
Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision and Kircher has now appealed from that 
decision. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
PARTIES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR ORAL PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT AS A COMPELLING REASON TO ORDER AN 
UNEQUAL DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARITAL HOME AS A COMPELLING 
REASONTOORDERANUNEQUAL 
DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN THE MANNER THE SALES 
PROCEEDS OF THE KRYSTAL CAFE BUILDING 
WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED IN EQUALIZING 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS? 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
PARTIES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR ORAL PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT AS A COMPELLING REASON TO ORDER AN 
UNEQUAL DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
Idaho Code $ 32-917 requires that "all contracts for marriage settlements must be 
in writing, and executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of 
land are required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." This requirement 
conforms to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), which has been adopted by 
most states. However, "[als an exception to the strict application of the Statute of Frauds, 
the doctrine of part performance is well-established in Idaho. Idaho Code 69-504; J& 
v. Clay, 103 Idaho 171, 177. 646 P.2d 413,419 (1982); Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 
187, 191, 628 P.2d 218, 222 (1981); Roundv v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625, 570 P.2d 862 
(1977); Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P.2d 925 (1968); Boesiner v. Freer, 85 
Idaho 551, 381 P.2d 802 (1963); Revnolds Irrigation Dist. v. S~uoat,  70 Idaho 217, 222, 
214 P.2d 880, 882 (1950)." Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,722, 
874 P.2d 528,533 (1994). 
"Partial performance exceptions to former statute of frauds requirements for 
premarital agreements remain applicable under Unifom~ Premarital Agreement Act. H d  
v. Hall, 271 Cal.Rptr. 773, 222 Cal.App.3d 578 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.1990)." Comments to 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act $2. 
While it is true that Idaho has not addressed the issue of whether partial 
perfomlance removes the writing requirement for marital agreements, Idaho does allow 
partial performance in other areas of contract law. A finding of partial performance in 
any area, by definition, is an exception to the statutory law. Partial performance is an 
equitable concept, and is applied to recognize the parties' actions consistent with an oral 
agreement in situations where the agreement was not reduced to writing. At trial, 
Kirchner asked the Court to consider the oral premarital agreement. Kircher argues that 
partial performance of an oral pre-nuptial agreement should remove the written 
requirement of such an agreement in the same manner as allowed in the other areas where 
the Statute of Frauds applied. This would give the Court authority to consider 
antenuptial agreement, as provided for in Idaho Code 332-712, of the parties, and take 
the actions of the parties, completely consistent with the oral agreement, into 
consideration in ordering an unequal distribution of the marital property. 
The oral premarital agreement of Kircher and Dunagan was that they would keep 
their earnings separate, and take care of their own debts. They did this for the duration of 
their marriage. Kircher owned the home before the marriage. Kircher made all 
payments associated with the marital home out of her own account, she made all 
payments associated with the Krystal Caf6 out of her own account. Now, Dunagan, who 
only became an "owner" of the house because of a bank loan requirement, has been 
awarded half the value of the home. He contributed none of his own income to the house 
related payments. By considering the way the parties handled their finances, the Court 
should have considered these facts in its consideration of the award of the home. The 
Court should not have been restrained by a strict application of a Statute of Frauds type 
argument. 
Kircher recognizes that Idaho courts have not considered the issue of whether 
partial or complete performance of an oral premarital agreement dispenses with the need 
for the agreement to he in writing-takes the agreement "out of '  the statute of frauds. 
However, the courts in other states have found that partial or complete performance of an 
oral premarital agreement makes the statute of frauds inapplicable. See Hall v. Hall, 222 
Cal.App.3d 578, 271 Cal.Rptr. 773, (Cal.App. 4 Dist.,1990), DewBerw v. George, 115 
Wash.App. 351, 62 P.3d 525, (Wash.App. Div. 1,2003), and In re Marriage ofLemoine- 
Hofinann, 827 P.2d 587 (Colo.App., 1992). 
Hall v. Hull, supra, addressed whether an oral premarital agreement made after 
enactment of the UPAA was, enforceable. In that case, after the death of his first wife, 
Aubrey Hall executed a revocable trust and a quitclaim deed transferring the fee interest 
in his residence to himself as trustee of the trust. During his lifetime Decedent was the 
sole beneficiary, and at his death his sons would inherit the property. In March, 1986, 
Aubrey met Carol and he convinced her to many him, quit her job, draw her social 
security at age 62, and give him $10,000. Evidence was presented that she would not 
have done any of those things without Aubrey's promise that she could live in the house 
for the rest of her life. In June, Carol quit her job, applied for social security upon 
reaching age 62, and gave Aubrey more than the agreed $10,000. In July, 1986, Aubrey 
and Carol were married. In October, 1986, Aubrey and Carol met with an attonley to 
amend the trust to provide Carol a life estate in the house. In January, 1987, before 
signing the amendment, Aubrey died. 
Carol filed suit against Aubrey's sons seeking determination of her right to the life 
estate. The court found that although the agreement was oral, it was removed from the 
statute of frauds by Carol's partial performance, and that she was entitled to a life estate 
in the house. The executor of Aubrey's estate, appealed. The court of appeals 
acknowledged that the agreement fell within the UPAA's provisions, and recognized that 
the rule requiring a writing is a statute of frauds law. However the court took notice that 
"[e]xceptions 'taking the case out of the statute' have traditionally been recognized as to 
all statute of frauds provisions. Thus, a substantial change of position in reliance on an 
oral agreement will estop reliance on the statute" (citations omitted). m, 222 Cal.App. 
at 585, 271 Cal. Rptr at 777. The key issue then was "whether the partial performance 
exception remains applicable under the act" I;rall. 222 Cal.App.3d at587, 271 Cal.Rptr. 
at 778. 
The court explained that under traditional law, partial performance of an 
agreement would remove that agreement from the statute of frauds. 
Relief because of the partial or full performance of the contract is 
usually granted in equity on the ground that the party who has so 
performed has been induced by the other party to irretrievably 
change his position and that to refuse relief according to the 
terms of the contract would otherwise amount to a fraud upon his 
rights." f Busque v. Mavcou (1952) 147 Me. 289.86 A.2d 873, 
876; see also O'Bvien v. O'Brien (1925) 197 Cal. 577. 241 P. 
861.) For relief to be granted because of partial performance of 
an oral antenuptial contract, the acts which are relied upon must 
be unequivocally referable to the contract. Acts which, although 
done in performance of the contract, admit to an explanation 
other than the contract (such as the performance of husbandly or 
wifely duties) are not generally acts of partial performance which 
will take the agreement out of the statute of frauds. (Trout v. 
Ogilvie, supra, 41 Cal.App. at p. 172, 182 P. 333.) 
The Court of Appeals held that the exceptions to the statute recognized under the 
former law where equally applicable to the UPAA. In construing the UPAA as not 
overriding traditional exceptions, the =court considered legislative intent and applied 
a rule of statutory construction and determined that the legislature did not intend to 
abrogate traditional equitable exceptions to statute of frauds requirements, 
We must assume the framers of the uniform act were well versed 
in the statute of frauds and knew about the exceptions applied to 
the writing requirement. Since the Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws apparently recognized the existence of traditional 
exceptions, and the reports of legislative committees commenting 
on the law make no suggestion of exclusion of the exceptions, we 
must assume it was intended such exceptions continue to be 
viable. We therefore find the trial court's reliance upon partial 
performance as removing the case from the statute to be justified. 
Id. 
In DewBerw v. George, 115 Wash.App. 351, 62 P.3d 525 (Wash.App. Div. 
1,2003), the parties were discussing marriage and George told DewBeny that he insisted 
on the following conditions of marriage: (I) DewBeny would always be fully employed; 
(2) each party's income and,property would be treated as separate property; (3) each party 
would own a home to return to if the marriage failed; and (4) DewBerry would not get 
fat. DewBeny agreed to these conditions. George and DewBeny married in 1986. The 
parties continually affirmed this agreement through words and actions. Painstaking and 
~~~eticulous efforts were made to maintain separate finances and property. During their 
marriage, DewBeny and George deposited their incomes into separate accounts which 
they used for their personal expenses and investments. 62 P.3d at 526-527. 
During their divorce proceedings, George argued that the trial court erred in 
finding by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" that an oral separate property 
agreement had been made by the parties prior to marriage and that it had been fully 
performed during their marriage, making it an enforceable agreement. He claimed that 
such an agreement is void under the statute of frauds. Id, at 528. 
The court held that the statute of frauds applied to the agreement in question, and 
concluded that it was enforceable under the part performance exception to the statute of 
frauds. The court stated that the doctrine of part performance is an equitable doctrine 
which provides the remedies of damages or specific performance for agreements that 
would otherwise be barred by the statute of frauds. In order to prove partial 
performance, two requirements must be met. First, the contract must be proven by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence. Second, the acts relied upon as constituting part 
performance must unmistakably point to the existence of the claimed agreement. If they 
point to some other relationship, such as that of landlord and tenant, or may be accounted 
for on some other hypothesis, they are not sufficient. Id. at 529, citing 362 Granauist v. 
McKean. 29 Wash.2d 440, 445. 187 P.2d 623 (1947). The court found that there was 
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there was an oral agreement. Further, it was 
found that the acts constituting part perfonnance strongly suggested a separate property 
agreement. The court stated: 
[Tlhe steps talten by the parties to avoid commingling of their 
assets were unusually strong evidence of a separate property 
agreement. It was undisputed that the parties meticulously 
accounted for and handled their individual incomes as separate 
property and created minimal joint accounts to handle certain 
family-related expenses and requirements. The husband and wife 
relationship cannot account for such painstaking efforts to 
establish and maintain separate property. 
Id. at 530. 
Dunagan and Kircher in this case had an oral premarital agreement to keep their 
finances, including their earnings and checking accounts separate. The parties did 
actually keep all their earnings, accounts, and all financial obligations separate. Kircher 
made all loan paynlents for the business from her account. Kircher made all house 
payments from her account. Kircher made all insurance payments and tax payments from 
her account. Dunagan kept his earnings separate and took care of his own financial 
obligations. Dunagan admitted that the parties kept their finances separate. (Tr. pg. 100, 
19, through pg. 105, 1.18). Everything that Kircher and Dunagan did indicate that there 
was a premarital agreement to keep their finances separate. 
Like in DewBerry, the husband and wife relationship does not account for such 
painstaking efforts to establish and maintain separate property. In addition, as in HA, 
Kircher irretrievably changed her position by the bank's requirement, not her free will, 
and that to refuse relief according to the terns of the contract would essentially amount to 
a fraud upon her rights. Because of the agreement to keep their finances, both income 
and debts, separate, Kircher was confident that the home she had prior to her marriage to 
Dunagan would be protected in the event her relationship with Dnnagan was 
unsuccessful, 
Idaho Code 532-712 provides, in pertinent part that: 
In case of divorce by the decree of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, the community property and the homestead must be 
assigned as follows: 
1. The community property must be assigned by the court in such 
proportions as the court, from all the facts of the case and the 
condition of the parties, deems just, with due consideration of the 
following factors: 
(a) Unless there are compelling reasons otherwise, there shall be 
a substantially equal division in value, considering debts, 
between the spouses. 
(b) Factors which may hear upon whether a division shall be 
equal, or the manner of division, include, but are not limited to: 
(1) Duration of the marriage; 
(2) Any antenuptial agreement of the parties; provided, however, 
that the court shall have no authority to amend or rescind any 
such agreement; 
(3) The age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, 
vocational skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse; 
(4) The needs of each spouse; 
(5) Whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to 
maintenance; 
( 6 )  The present and potential earning capability of each party; 
and 
(7) Retirement benefits, including, but not limited to, social 
security, civil service, military and railroad retirement benefits. 
This rule allows courts to order an unequal distribution of property when compelling 
reasons indicate that fairness requires such a division. Idaho's recognition, and 
application, of the doctrine of partial performance in the area of oral premarital 
agreements would enhance the court's ability to make a fair distribution, considering all 
the circumstailces in a given case, of the marital property. Because Idaho Code 532-712 
provides that the court may consider any antenuptial agreement of the parties, and 
because Idaho has already recognized that the doctrine of partial performance in other 
contract areas removes the requirement that the agreement be in writing, the Court should 
at least consider the parties oral prenuptial agreement in determining whether an unequal 
distribution of the community property was appropriate. The lack of a written agreement 
in the present situation should not be an absolute bar to such consideration. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARITAL HOME AS A 
COMPELLING REASON TO ORDER AN UNEQUAL 
DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY. 
The marital home was valued at $125,000. The magistrate found that the home 
had been transmuted from the separate property of Kircher to community property by 
virtue of a deed signed in order to obtain a home loan. The only evidence of a 
transmutation was the deed itself. The Court, relying on the Statute of Frauds, did not 
consider other evidence. It is interesting to note that in distinguishing the present case 
from the Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 80 P.3d 1049 (2003), the Court set 
forth the standard for transmutation of property (Memorandum Opinion & Decision, pg. 
15), as follows: 
In Hoskinson, the Supreme Court held that the spouse failed 
to prove a "transmutation by clear and convincing 
evidence". The evidence did not establish that Read 
intended to make a gift to the community". 
Id. at 460. 
By applying the Statute of Frauds, the only standard that the Court used was the deed 
itself, the Court's reasoning was that there was no ambiguity in the deed. While that may 
be the case in this instance, and assuming that a transmutation did occur, the magistrate 
still should have considered the surrounding facts in ordering an unequal distrihution of 
the com~nunity property. At the time of Kircher's marriage to Dunagan, Kircher only 
owed $48,000 on the home. The parties had been married a little more than one year 
when the deed was executed. At the time of the divorce the outstanding loan on the 
house was $60,597.34. (Tr., pg. 148.) All loan and mortgage payments for the marital 
home were paid out of Kircher's account. Du~lagan had no interest in the home at the 
time of the marriage and made no payments associated with the home during the duration 
of the marriage. Even Dunagm recognized that the home belonged to Kircher. (Tr., pg. 
67.) Kircher's offer of proof (Tr., p. 172, 1. 5-17) goes into details of Kircher's extreme 
work hours to make her payments. 
The tnagistrate was guided by his understanding that the most important factor in 
allowing an unequal distribution is hardship (Memorandum Opinion and Decision, pg. 5), 
and that only in the rarest circumstances would there be an unequal distribution of the 
property (Tr., pg. 175.) However, there are no cases saying that hardship is the most 
important factor in ordering an unequal distribution, and while Idaho Code $32-712 
requires compelling reasons, there is no reason to believe that the reasons are only found 
in the rarest of circu~nstances. If hardship is a compelling reason, then Kircher's situation 
certainly represents a hardship. Taking the home's value and outstanding loan into 
consideration, there is $64,402.66 in equity in the home. Kircher has paid the house 
down twice out of her own checking account. The entire value of the home was 
considered as being awarded to Kircher as colnmunity property, and contributes to the 
$108,500 equalization payment that Kircher has been ordered to pay. The only reason 
that Dunagan has a community interest in the home is because the bank required 
Dunagan to be on the loan. It is vastly unjust to require Kircher to owe money to 
Dunagan for an asset that was owned solely by her prior to the marriage, and paid for 
solely by her during the course of the marriage. 
Idaho Code 432-712 provides an illustrative, but incomplete, list of factors to 
consider in ordering an unequal distribution of the community property. The magistrate 
erred in not considering the facts surrounding the marital home in his decision. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN THE MANNER THE SALES 
PROCEEDS OF THE KRYSTAL CAFE BUILDING 
WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED IN EQUALIZING 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNITY ASSETS? 
Magistrates are required to consider the circumstances of each case and decide the 
most equitable manner for dividing and valuing community property. Hunt v. Hunt, 137 
Idaho 18,43 P.3d 777 (2002). Community property should be divided in a substantially 
equal manner unless there are compelling reasons which justify an unequal distribution. 
Idaho Code 432-712 (1); and Rice v. Rice, 103 Idaho 85, 645 P.2d 319 (1982). A 
magistrate's distribution of community property must be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion. Hunt, supra. Here, the magistrate failed to follow the law with respect to the 
disposition of the Krystal Caf6 building. 
Idaho Code 5 32-713 provides: 
The court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make 
such order for the disposition of the commuility property, 
and of the homestead as in this chapter provided, and, 
whenever necessary for that purpose, may order a partition 
or sale of the property and a division or other disposition of 
the proceeds. 
Under Idaho Code 5 32-713, the magistrate had the option of: 1) awarding the buildiilg 
to one party with a corresponding award of value of property to the other; 2) ordering the 
building sold and dividing the proceeds equally between the parties; or 3) ordering the 
building partitioned between the parties. Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970, 88 P.3d 1210 
(2004). The magistrate, however, exercised none of those options. 
The magistrate did award the building to Kircher outright, as required under 
the first option. Rather, it awarded her the building & if she pays Dunagan $108,500 
within sixty days. If Kircher does not meet that condition, Dunagan is not obligated to 
transfer his interest to Kircher and, as a consequence, the building will remain jointly 
owned. At trial, Kircher testified that her ability to make an equalizing payment was 
limited to $30,000. Clearly she could not pay $108,500. The effect of the Judge's 
dtcision was that the building be sold, but the burden of failing to achieve the full sales 
price fell solely on Kircher. 
Dunagail will argue that the magistrate did actually award the Krystal Caf6 
building to Kircher, and that the fact that Dunagan does not have to transfer his interest to 
Kircher until the equalization payment is made or the building is sold, is of no 
consequence. The magistrate did not award the building to Kircher outright as is required 
by Idaho Code 332-713. Only if she is able to pay Dunagan $108,500 within sixty days 
is the property solely hers. If Kircher is unable to make the payment then Dunagan is 
not obligated to transfer his interest to her. The property would then be held jointly until 
it sells. During that period, Dunagan is an owner of the property, and has all the rights 
and benefits that an owner of property enjoys, but none of the financial resvonsibilities. 
Such responsibilities fall entirely on Kircher. 
This serves to illustrate very clearly the fact that the property was not in actuality 
awarded to Kircher. It is situations like this that applying the statute as written and 
judicially interpreted, i.e. 1) awarding the building to one party with a corresponding 
award of value of property to the other; 2) ordering tl~e building sold and dividing the 
proceeds equally between the party; or 3) ordering the building partitioned between the 
parties, Larsoa v. Larsoa, 139 Idaho 970, 88 P.3d 1210 (2004), would avoid. It "flies in 
the face of common sense" to allow one party to have control over property that has 
supposedly been awarded to the other party. 
Therefore, the magistrate erred in failing to make a disposition in accordance with 
Idaho Code 332-713. 
Kircher's claim that the magistrate erred by failing to base the equalization 
payment on the actual sale price comes from his citation of case law: 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at the time of the 
Decree based upon the fair market value of the property at the 
time of the divorce. Brinkmever v. Brinkmever, 135 Idaho 596, 
600, 21 P.3d 918 (2001). As noted by the Supreme Court, "Any 
community asset may change in value after the division of the 
community. This is not a reason to modify the division. 
Ross v. Ross, 117 Idaho 548,789 P.2d 1139 (1990). 
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It is clear that the magistrate felt he was required to establish the value as of the date of 
his decision. This is incorrect. The value of property unconditionally awarded to one 
party is normally valued at the time of the order. As shown above, this property was not 
unconditionally awarded to Kircher. Idaho Code $32-713 requires an equal distribution 
of the proceeds. Even using the $236,500 fair market value, Kircher will receive less 
that1 Dunagan, and the disparity increases with every dollar less than the determined fair 
market value received for the property. The question is why should Kircher bear all the 
risk associated with the sale? Dunagan gets the same amount under the current order if 
the property sells for less than the presumed market value. The statement by the trial 
court that "[tlhe Kircher's proposal has appeal as it gives both Kircher and Dunagan an 
equal stake in the sale" shows that he recognized the potential inequity of his order, but 
his followii~g citation of case law indicates that he did not feel he could do anything but 
determine the value as of the date of his decision. 
Thus, the magistrate erred because he exercised none of the options available to 
him under Idaho Code 832-713. 
And, of course, the magistrate did order the third option that the building be 
partitioned. 
The magistrate also erred by failing to base the equalization payment on the actual 
sale price. This error is based on the magistrate's mistaken belief that he did have the 
discretion to enter such an order. The magistrate's decision on the issue is repeated 
below: 
The Defendant's proposal has appeal as it gives both the 
Defendant and the Plaintiff an equal stake in the sale. 
Despite such appeal, I deny Kircher's request. 
The value of the equalization payment is fixed at 
the time of the Decree based upon the fair market value of 
the property at the time of the divorce. Brinkmever v. 
Brinkmever, 135 Idaho 596, 600, 21 P.3d 918 (2001). As 
noted by the Supreme Court, "Any community asset may 
change in value after the division of the commnunity. This 
is not a reason to modify the division. Ross v. Ross, 11 7 
Idaho 548,789 P.2d 1139 (1990). The Plaintiff should not 
be penalized by the Defendant's actions while controlling 
use of the building or by the vagaries of the market. By 
fixing the equalization payment, this Court is removed 
from becoming intimately involved with the Plaintiffs 
actions or inactions in controlling the building since the 
date the value was established. Also, the Defendant has 
alternatives to selling the Cafb such as by selling her own 
home andlor loans. 
Thus, the magistrate apparently believed that he was required to establish value as of the 
date of his decision, and that the value could not thereafter be modified. The magistrate 
was incorrect. While it is true that the value of property unconditionally assigned to one 
party should normally be established as of the date of the order, there is no such rule in 
the case of an ordered sale under Idaho Code 532-713. In fact, as mentioned, Idaho Code 
532-713 requires an equal distribution of the proceeds -whatever those proceeds may be. 
Further, magistrates & have the discretion to reserve jurisdiction over property 
distributions until the actual value of the properly can be established. Hunt v. Hunt, 137 
Idaho 18, 43 P.3d 777 (2002). Indeed, given the uncertainty involved in valuing real 
property, that method is certainly the most fair and equitable. Thus, the magistrate erred 
by "failing to rightly perceive the issue as one of discretion." 
The potential problems resulting froin the magistrate's abuse of discretion are 
easily illustrated. Assume that Kircher cannot pay Dunagan $108,500 within 60 days. 
Under those circumstances, she would not acquire sole title to the property, and the 
property would be sold. Assume also that the property sells for only $150,000 - the 
value estimated by Dunagan, and $60,000 more than the assessed value. After paying off 
the underlying debt and $10,000 in sale costs (real estate commissions, etc.), the net sale 
proceeds would be approximately $100,000. Under the court's order, Dunagan's 
equalization payment would be reduced by one-half of the sale costs, or $5,000, which 
would mean that Kircher would still owe him $103,500 - $3,500 more than the net sale 
proceeds. The result would be that Dunagan would get $100,000 from the sale of the 
building, Kircher would get nothing, and Kircher would still owe Dunagan $3,500 - a 
highly inequitable and unfair result and contrary to the rule that community assets should 
be divided equally. 
If, on the other hand, the court had held that the equalization payment should be 
based on the actual sale price, then the equalization payment would be reduced by 
$43,250 (one-half the difference in the assumed fair market value and the actual sale 
price), and $5,000 (one-half the sale costs), which would mean that Kircher would owe 
Dunagan only $60,250. As a consequence, Dunagan would receive $60,250 out of the 
net sale proceeds and Kircher would receive $39,750 - a much more fair and equitable 
result. 
It should also be noted that setting the equalization payment based oil the actual 
sale price could never be an unfair detriment to Dunagan. If the building sells for less 
than the estimated fair market value, Dunagan will receive his righthl one-half share of 
the actual value of the building; if the building sells at the estimated fair market value, 
Dunagan will receive the entire amount of the equalization payment; if the building sells 
at more than the estimated fair market value, Dunagan will receive more than the ordered 
equalization payment. In fact, the only reason Dunagan would object to that proposal 
would be that he believes the building is worth far less than the value found by the 
magistrate. 
"Unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise, the court in a divorce 
action is required to make a substantially equal division in value, considering debts, of 
the community property between the spouses." Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970,972. 88 
P.3d 1210, 1212 (2004), Citing, Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982 (1991); 
Idaho Code $32-712(1)(a) (1996). "If the judge chooses substantial equality, the issue on 
appeal is a factual one--whether substantial and competent evidence shows that such 
equality actually bas been achieved." Bailey v. Bailey, 107 Idaho 324,328,689 P.2d 216, 
220 (Ct.App., 1984). The magistrate in this case did not achieve substantial equality in 
his division of the estate. 
As stated above, after awarding the property of the estate to Dunagan and Kircher, 
the magistrate concluded that Kircher was receiving $108,500 more in community 
property than Dunagan. The magistrate, therefore, ordered Kircher to pay Dunagan 
$108,500 to equalize the distribution. The discussion in the preceding section illustrates 
the problem of presuming that "substantiaI equality" has been achieved. With the courts 
current order, there is no way of knowing whether or not the property distribution is 
substantially equal until after the sale of the Krystal Caf6. Only if the caf6 sells for the 
assigned value of $236,500 would the distribution between the parties be equal. 
Had the court held that the equalization payment would be based on the actual 
sale price, then the equalization payment would actually serve to equalize. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate made a mistake of law in determining that he could not consider 
the oral prenuptial agreement made between the parties. While the Idaho Code requires 
that marital agreements be in writing, partial perfonnailce of the agreement dispenses 
with the writing requirement. 
Further, the magistrate made a mistake of law by too narrowly construing the tern? 
"compelling reasons" and not fully considering all of the facts surrounding the marital 
home. 
The magistrate erred in the disposition of the Krystal Caf6. Under Idaho Code 
$32-713, the magistrate had three options: 1) awarding the building to one party with a 
corresponding award of value of property to the other; 2) ordering the building sold and 
dividing the proceeds equally between the party; or 3) ordering the building partitioned 
between the parties. The magistrate, however, exercised none of those options. 
The Court also erred in ordering that the equalization payment had to be 
determined at the time of the magistrate's decision. He did not realize that he had the 
option of basing the payment on the actual sale price of the property. Thus, the 
magistrate erred by "failing to rightly perceive the issue as one of discretion." 
Finally, the magistrate made a mistake of fact in determining that the disposition 
he ordered achieved substai~tial equality as required by Idaho Code $32-713. 
"Substantial and competent evidence" does not show that equality actually has been 
achieved. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should order the following: 
1. The Court should order the lower Court to take into 
consideration the oral Prenuptial Agreement entered 
into between the parties and the circumstances 
surrounding the home owned by Kircher prior to the 
marriage of the parties in reaching an equitable 
division of the property. 
2. In any event, this Court should order that the amount 
of any equalization payment Kircher owes Dunagan 
be determined only after the Krystal Cafe? is sold and 
the net proceeds are known to the parties. 
se- 
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